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Abstract: This article argues that a more critical approach to innovation policy within planning is
needed and offers recommendations for achieving this. These recommendations entail rethinking the
values, focus, speed, and legitimacy of innovations. It takes a critical perspective on how contemporary
societies treat rapid innovation as having necessarily positive results in the achievement of objectives
such as sustainability and justice. This critical perspective is needed because innovation can both
contribute to and drive a form of maladaptive planning: a collective approach to reality that imposes
constant and rapid changes to societal configurations due to an obsession with the new and with
too little rapport with the problems in place or that it creates. A maladaptive direction for transport
planning is used as a sectorial illustration of the broader conceptual ideas presented: for both
sustainability and social justice reasons, it would be desirable to see peak car occurring. However,
the car industry is presenting driving automation as an innovation with the potential to restore
the vitality of the private vehicles market while creating effective means to dismiss alternatives to
car dominance.
Keywords: innovation; responsibility; evolution; maladaptation; contrived change; automated
mobility; automated vehicles
1. Introduction
This article aims to challenge the dominant innovation logic applied today in planning generally
and in transport planning particularly. In our view, this logic is not sufficiently self-critical and
is leading policy-makers to actively engage with what is referred to here as maladaptive planning.
This innovation-driven form of planning is characterized by the imposition of constant and rapid
changes to existing configurations beyond (or instead of) what is constructive. This leads it to fail to
address emerging problems while creating unnecessary risks and new problems for urban areas and
their citizens. That is, in policy-making environments dominated by maladaptive planning, social and
technological configurations change for the sake of changing due to a fascination with innovation as a
meta-goal of public policy [1,2] and with too little rapport and concern with the problems being faced
on the ground—as warned against by UN-Habitat ([3] p. 95).
It is well accepted today that the fast-paced and unchecked development of an increasing number
of so-called smart technologies, propelled by the driver of technological innovation, represents a
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massive governance and research challenge, as well as a substantial source of social, economic, and
environmental risks [4–10]. These risks are being accepted because innovation as an intrinsically
positive value has found a stronghold in contemporary societies, policy-making circles, and academic
communities [7,11]. The so-called pro-innovation bias [7] is now well-established. For example,
innovation has been positioned as essential for the economic growth of urban areas as they compete
for limited resources [12]. This has happened without a serious reflection about whether innovation,
and also urban competition and even economic growth, are desirable to address the problem of urban
resource scarcity [13–15]. As a result of the pro-innovation bias, a growing number of authors and
institutions have been asking for more technologically and socially innovative policies, technologies,
and initiatives to be implemented at an increasingly faster pace (e.g., [16–21]). The time is ripe for
planners to stand back for a moment from this innovation-driven Great Acceleration [5,6,22–25] and to
carefully think about what is being gained or lost due to it. Without wanting to argue that innovation
is necessarily problematic in all circumstances—as in many cases the best approach might be, indeed,
to innovate (for examples of arguments in favour, or supportive, of innovation, see [20,26–31])—we
actively want to spark a lively debate about this topic by adopting a purposefully critical and radical
approach to innovation.
The argument defended by pro-innovation stakeholders is that a number of problems, such as economic
underperformance, poor health, lack of environmental sustainability, and social exclusion, can (and must)
be resolved through constant, disruptive, and rapid innovation (see, for example, [16,18,20,28,29,32,33]).
However, there is increasing awareness that, if poorly governed, innovations can be applied too fast and
irresponsibly [34,35]. Innovations can also be unhelpful or even destructive [8,9], can have unintended
and undesirable consequences [7], and can damage democracy due to the inescapable incapacity of
democratic institutions to quickly respond to excessively rapid and radical changes [6]. Promoting
continuous and rapid changes through repetitive rounds of disruptive innovation can disconnect
solutions from the problems they mean to address and lead to the proliferation of pointless novelties [9].
In fact, excessively rapid and uncritical innovation can foster the implementation of contrived policies
likely to become sources of new problems (and therefore contribute to the gradual accumulation of
unresolved problems) and where, paradoxically, the benefits of previous innovations are not explored
while new innovations are already emerging [36,37]. It has been shown that innovation-oriented urban
policies can serve little else than the interests of predatory forms of capitalism in repetitive rounds
of urban regeneration, gentrification, and urban obsolescence [38–41]. All these above mentioned
examples are potential drivers of what this article refers to as maladaptive planning.
Following Godin [42], innovation can be defined as a non-trivial and novel change in established
institutional structures, social practices, technologies, artefacts, symbols, or narratives. As innovations
have different scales of magnitude, Freeman and Perez [43] proposed the now classic taxonomy for
innovations: incremental (likely to continuously occur within a given organization or sector); radical
(typically resulting from carefully crafted collaborations between governments, research institutions,
and the private sector); changes of the technological system (with the potential to lead to consequences
in several activity sectors); and changes of the techno-economic paradigm (which represent mutations
at a societal level). This taxonomy suggests that important synergies between innovation studies and
evolutionary theory could be identified. For this reason, the article uses some aspects of evolutionary
theory (see, for example, [44–48]) in an exploratory way to address the proposed topic. We have
adopted an approach to evolutionary theory that is based on four key sequential principles: (i)
generation of alternatives for future initiatives, (ii) competition among alternatives and reduction
of variety through some mechanism of assessment; (iii) selection for implementation based on the
assessment; and (iv) dissemination. These principles serve to structure the argument of the article.
It should be acknowledged that there is the potential for major evolutionary improvements to
result from high-magnitude innovations, particularly when they resolve crucial social or environmental
challenges created and or maintained by the existing lock-in. As noted by Boon and Edler [49],
recent developments in innovation policy are seeking to harmonize emerging innovations with grand
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societal challenges such as climate change and ageing populations. There are, however, other ways to
achieve constructive outcomes beyond innovation. These include, for example, the return to abandoned
historical configurations that, seen retrospectively, provided simple but sound solutions: Consider
the case of promoting cycling in contemporary cities as a means to achieve sustainable and active
mobility. Similarly, producing and consuming less, and exploiting natural resources more sparsely and
respectfully, might be the solution for many of the problems that affect contemporary societies beyond
the need for any type of innovation [50,51].
This article is based on a systematic review conducted by the authors of the literature concerned
with innovation, sustainable mobility and transport automation, and evolutionary theory applied to
urban and transport planning. This led to a collective debate and reflection that has culminated in
the production of the present article. From this joint reflection, it became clear that planning—and
particularly transport planning—has not yet fully engaged with an emerging branch of more critical
literature concerned with (responsible versus irresponsible) innovation. This systematic literature
review has also shown that there is a significant lack of synergies between innovation scholars and
those engaged with evolutionary theory. These knowledge and research gaps are probably leading
transport planning organizations to implement policies and initiatives that are not as informed as
they could be. Hopefully, the present article will serve to partially address this research gap and
planning issue.
Before concluding this introduction, it is important to clarify that the article was written using a
critical and somewhat radical voice. This choice was purposefully made to spark reactions and induce
debate. The reader should therefore be aware of this intention and subsequent choice in terms of writing
style while reading the article, which is structured as follows. In the next section, we critically discuss
the complex subject of innovation and some of its interconnections with the planning field. After this,
we present our approach to evolutionary theory. This allows us to offer an evolutionary reflection on
innovation, making use of the example of automated vehicles for illustration. Even though we use an
example from transport, the argument has cross-sectoral relevance, and it could have been illustrated
with a variety of examples from other fields of activity without any connection with either transport or
urban planning. We conclude the article with some policy implications and summarizing thoughts.
2. Innovation in Planning: A Most Needed Critical Perspective
Innovating is defined here as a process that alters the existing order through novel changes
in institutions, technologies, social practices, and understandings [7]. In contemporary language,
the word innovation is often interchangeably used as referring to the act of innovating (process);
the result of that act, that is, the innovation itself (object); or the positive quality of something that
is simultaneously considered new and good (value). In alignment with the nature of our argument
presented below, we have refrained from considering “innovation” or “innovative” as intrinsically
positive qualities of a given object or process. This implies that innovations can be both constructive
and problematic for the public interest—as highlighted by researchers concerned with responsible
innovation [34,52,53].
The positive connotation contemporarily given to the innovative is a recent phenomenon.
Godin [42] shows that the concept of innovation has experienced five stages across history. First,
innovation was seen as a forbidden concept. For example, during the Renaissance, innovation was
considered heresy. Second, from the 17th century, it became a polemical concept and a rhetorical device
to combat rapid and radical change. Innovation then became a pejorative term to be used against those
attempting to change the establishment. Third, from the 19th century, innovation started to be seen as
a positive concept and a means to achieve economic gains, although those undertaking innovations
were not yet given much credit. Fourth, around the 1960s, innovation became a fully-fledged concept
receiving positive attention, especially from economic theorists. According to Godin, the fifth and
current stage corresponds to a situation where contrived change (that is, innovation for the sake
of innovation) is uncritically accepted as positive by a variety of organizations and political forces.
Urban Sci. 2020, 4, 41 4 of 17
This means that creating novel technologies, organizations, practices, and understandings is now seen
by several key innovation stakeholders as an intrinsically desirable meta-goal of public policy to be
transversally applied to all policy-making fields, from education to health and from immigration to
transport [1,19,20,33]. As Godin ([42] p. 53) notes, today ‘innovation has turned into a catchword or a
buzzword, with a legitimizing function’ frequently used to attract funding, sales, and attention.
Soete [54] argues that innovation is today frequently used as a form of destructive creation (in
opposition to creative destruction), that is, innovation serving the interests of the few against the
public interest. Innovations aimed at promoting planned obsolescence of technological devices are an
example of destructive creation. Paradoxically, and even though planned obsolescence is essentially
unethical and against the public interest, contemporary societies became very receptive to so-called
innovative technologies that were designed according to the principles of planned obsolescence and
that are, therefore, unlikely to work for long while creating massive waste problems. Urban planning
has not escaped the logic of obsolescence and has, to a large extent, integrated it in the way it deals
with space. This is to be observed in a number of urban regeneration processes and experiments across
the world, where the obsolescence of the built environment is in many cases cyclically used as a means
to serve the vested interests of the elites [38,39,55,56]. In line with this, a growing number of authors
is alerting that planning is becoming increasingly bound to use innovative approaches to facilitate
capital accumulation for the exclusive benefit of the super-rich [14,40,41].
The high value given to fast and frequent innovation is also problematic for learning. As Sveiby [35]
alerts, regular and rapid changes make it difficult to learn about the emergent socio-technical
configurations before they become obsolete and the next set of skills needs to be developed. This can
lead both individuals and organizations to respond to problems and events in ways that are downright
inappropriate. In Sveiby’s view (but see also [54]), the 2008 economic crisis was, to a large extent,
the result of excessive innovation in the financial sector, disabling the capacity of finance agents to
understand what was happening and the risks they were taking.
As long as innovation is credited as a public goal in itself, it can distract policy-makers from public
goals proper, such as promoting sustainability and justice. This happens because the relationships
between means and ends are harder to discern in the case of sustainability and justice than when
means and ends are one and the same, as happens in the less critical (but very dominant) strands of
innovation policy where implementing innovations is desirable in itself because it is innovative. This is
a circular logic, but an effective and resilient one in contemporary discourses and policy-making (see,
for examples, [9]). There is, indeed, some advantage for the advocators of any idea to intertwine means
and ends because that makes it more straightforward to politically sell the idea, implement it, and claim
that it was successful. It is easy to claim that an innovation-oriented policy was successful because it
led to the implementation of innovations (due to the self-fulfilling prophecy logic of such reasoning).
Conversely, it can be quite difficult to claim that a sustainability-oriented (or social justice-oriented)
policy was successful, as sustainability (or social justice) is harder to achieve and consensually measure.
The benefits for policy makers of intertwining certain means and ends are therefore clear.
Sen [57] argues that a given course of action can only be considered more desirable over others if it
leads to more effective end benefits than its alternatives, and not simply because it is characterized by a
given design feature (such as being innovative). In line with this, we propose that it is worthwhile and
necessary to continue making the effort of separating means (such as innovating) from proper public
goals (such as sustainability and social justice), as this is a key precondition for the critical analysis
of the efficacy of choices. Moreover, considering that it is necessary to implement an innovation to
solve a problem can, de facto, serve to make it difficult to effectively solve the problem because the best
solution for the problem might not be innovative. Due to this possibility, the pro-innovation bias can
also serve to force problem-solvers to engage in questionable rhetoric exercises to present the adoption
of a traditional solution as being innovative [58].
Furthermore, as discussed by Krüger and Pellicer-Sifrean [59], an excessive focus on innovation
can mislead collective judgement and decision-making, leading policy-makers to believe that only
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through innovation can constructive changes emerge (therefore dismissing alternative possibilities
such as self-empowerment and the return to solutions effectively used in the past); it can lead to the
excessive activation of not yet fully drained personal, social, and environmental resources; and it can
contribute to downplaying the importance of maintaining democratic debates when seeking solutions
to wicked problems—as a fiction is created where forthcoming novelties will allegedly be able to solve
all sorts of difficulties in a constructive and harmonious way. Additionally, the same authors argue that
this focus on innovation can downplay the value of traditional lifestyles, which are rendered outdated
even though they might have solutions for many of the socio-ecological problems that innovations are
supposed to solve (see also [58]).
However, the current social and economic order imposed by Big Tech firms, and specifically those
that promote surveillance forms of capitalism, requires the legitimation of constant and rapid innovation
to maintain their own dominance. Big Tech firms need the constant growth of data acquisition means
so that they can successfully continue their business of data extraction from individuals, prediction of
their behavior, and sales of these predictions to other companies [60,61]. This is a key challenge that
Big Tech firms experience today, which Zuboff [61] calls the data extraction imperative. As we will see,
automated vehicles are a key element of the strategy to satisfy the data extraction imperative of Big Tech
firms, through which they can further assert their dominance in the urban environment as a non-virtual
space of data extraction and behavioral control. For stakeholders of this nature, innovation is essential
because only a discourse fundamentally supportive of it can legitimize their corporate strategies.
Before continuing, it is important to note that Big Tech firms are not alone in the adoption of
profit- and control-seeking corporate behavior, as well as in the adoption of undemocratic strategies.
The planning and planning-related literature presents a variety of examples where capital accumulation
processes have employed novel and highly ingenuous means to act against the public interest while
depoliticizing institutions and downgrading democracy. This body of literature presents multiple
theorizations and examples from both urban planning and land use policy (e.g., [38,62–65]) and
transport planning (e.g., [66,67]). Reigner and Brenac [66] alert their readers to a particularly ingenuous,
and subtle, anti-democratic trend to be observed today in transport planning: the tendency to permeate
transport policies with moralistic claims (e.g., “to move without creating pollution” or “to move but
without harm”). This apparently benign trend is problematic because policies implemented under
such moralistic banners are very difficult to contest, even when they are creating significant problems
in other, or even the same, moral terms.
In summary, and in light of the abovementioned scholarly contributions, the emergence of
automated vehicles (AVs) can be seen as one of the latest developments in the process of capital
accumulation, following the increasingly dominant logic of techno-finance fixing [68]. This logic
is characterized by the advocacy of innovative and technologically-intensive free-market solutions
(frequently saturated with moralistic claims, e.g., “human driving errors kill people and therefore
driving automation is a policy imperative”) that maintain neoliberal business-as-usual while failing
to address the social and sustainability problems in place. The innovation and techno-finance fixing
nexus can represent a serious evolutionary problem for our societies: While their complexity increases
due to constant new waves of (increasingly inept) innovations, their (very real) problems accumulate.
Historically, this pattern of evolution has been associated with societal collapse [69]. This takes us to
the next section.
3. Evolutionary Theory Applied to Planning Processes: A Brief Overview
Evolution is a process of change driven by dynamics of adaptation to existing or emerging
conditions. When evolution is specifically seen as a concept capable of informing public policy, there is a
variety of evolutionary approaches to be considered, particularly strategic niche management, transition
management, and time strategies [70]. These approaches have a number of important theoretical and
practical distinctions; however, they have in common the understanding that evolutionary approaches
to policy-making in one way or another adopt the following basic sequential principles:
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1. Promotion of variety through the creation of alternatives,
2. Assessment of alternatives,
3. Selection of one alternative for implementation in the local context,
4. Dissemination in various contexts if, when, and where appropriate.
Innovating is a process in which variety of alternatives is promoted. Therefore, it can assist
the first principle of evolution. However, the alternatives can also be historically retrieved (that is,
when abandoned technologies and practices are adopted again) or result from combinations of the
historically retrieved with the established, the innovative, and the do-nothing alternative.
Note that the four principles do not necessarily occur in the given order. For example,
some initiatives are assessed after implementation, while the promotion of variety can happen during
dissemination. However, as will be discussed later, changing the sequence can have drawbacks. Note as
well that the assessment of fitness is simultaneously carried out by policy-makers, funding agencies and
planners, organizations, and the public, as well as by the social, economic, and natural environments.
Acknowledging these human and non-human agents and their roles in evolutionary processes is
relevant because maladaptation emerges from their dialectic actions and emergent relationships.
Maladaptation occurs when policy-makers, funding agencies, planners, and other relevant political
stakeholders insist on proliferating and then positively assessing, implementing, and disseminating
initiatives that have too little rapport with, and or are not fit for, the challenges being experienced in
the social, economic, and natural environments. Alkemade and Hekkert [71] alert for the excessive
orientation of innovation policy to promote competitiveness and economic growth—in many cases
at the expense of environmental sustainability. With this, innovation contributes to maintaining
the existing unsustainability lock-in instead of contributing to promote systemic change towards
sustainability. The case to be introduced below—that of automated vehicles—is a paradigmatic
example of this orientation: In a moment when peak car might be finally taking place (for a discussion
see [72]), innovators emerge as rescuers of the car industry and car dominance.
Three clarifying remarks are necessary before continuing. First, we are not focusing on evolution
at the level of individuals or species. The adopted approach is instead based on the work of theorists
such as Bertolini [46,47,73], Moroni [44], and Van Assche and Beunen [45] who focus on the evolution
of institutions and policy-making practices rather than of individuals. The units of analysis here are
therefore policy-making practices and policies and the technologies and social practices co-endorsed
by them.
Second, in our view, evolution is bereft of ethical orientations. It is not, by default, aimed at
moving systems from the worse to the better, as is sometimes implied, for instance, in European
Commission or Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) documents [16–19].
In the sense we give it, saying that something is more evolved is not a statement about its enhanced
qualities in comparison to something that is less evolved. Instead, it is a statement about the extent to
which something has been exposed to repeated iterations of variety creation, assessment, selection,
and dissemination. An example: Automated vehicles will be more evolved than those requiring a
human driver, as they will be the result of substantially more evolutionary iterations. Are they better,
though? Maybe not: The current debate in academic circles raises skepticism about their added value
for the public interest [4,74–76].
Third, evolution simultaneously occurs within various nested evolutionary milieus. These might
be associated with different and, in some cases, contradictory assessments of fitness. This leads to
evolutionary paradoxes. Consider the case of climate change driven by the transport sector: The use
of the automobile is an evolution supported by many societies. This evolution is problematic for the
natural environment and can eventually lead to a situation in which humans cannot survive in it.
This means that what can be perceived as an adaptation in a given evolutionary milieu (e.g., using
private cars in car-friendly cities for private benefit) is a maladaptation in another evolutionary milieu
that includes the previous one (e.g., using private cars in car-friendly cities that exist in a fragile world
experiencing climate change). This paradox is at the core of our argument: Promoting innovation can
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easily lead to the selection of certain alternatives that become very successful in the policy environment
(and are, therefore, funded and promoted by key stakeholders). These can be, however, maladaptive
in the social and natural environments in which the policy environment is nested.
4. Maladaptive Policy-Making and Automated Transport
This section will explore some possible mechanisms leading to the emergence of maladaptive
policies due to an excessive focus on innovation. For this, it will use the four evolutionary principles
presented above. The mechanisms will be discussed using the case of automated vehicles (AVs)
for illustration.
AVs are understood here as cars with the ability to independently perform all driving tasks in
any street or road environment—a definition that essentially matches the so-called “level 5” of vehicle
automation [77]. Litman [78] foresees that some pioneer AV models might start to operate in some
places already in the 2020s. Originally conceived in the 1940s to reduce traffic fatalities and increase
safety, it is most likely that much can be gained (but also lost) from their deployment [79]. Examples
of the potential benefits of such machines are: enhanced energy efficiency; reduced traffic accidents;
greater mobility for disabled people, the elderly and all those unable to drive; reduction of urban areas
dedicated to car parking; customized mobility services; and optimized delivery of goods—among
many other possibilities. However, AVs have now become entangled in a narrative where they are
presented as a silver bullet solution for the key problems experienced in the transport sector and
that any problems they might generate will be addressed by additional technological enhancements.
As stated by Shladover [80] p. 199, these narratives have transformed “qualified statements by system
developers into seriously inflated and unrealistic interpretations” (e.g., [81]). As we will see below,
the way AVs are emerging constitute an example of how innovation is driving societal dynamics most
unlikely to be aligned with the public interest. These dynamics constitute a planning orientation that
manifests the tendency of contemporary mobility to both reinforce and internalize risk at a systemic,
quasi-ontological, level [82].
Note that maladaptive tendencies can manifest because of other drivers besides the excessive focus
on innovation. For example, policy makers and public servants might become too focused on playing
blame games, that is, they become primarily interested in protecting their own careers and agencies
while attacking other careers and agencies in ways that are disconnected from the purpose of their
institutions [83]. This is a specific case of a more general phenomenon where public servants develop
working cultures that are focused on individual objectives misaligned with the collective objectives
of the institution for which they work—a problem potentially resulting from the implementation of
poor assessment metrics [84] or by excessively intricate bureaucracies [85]. In summary, maladaptive
planning can be generated and aggravated by a range of factors. This article specifically discusses
how an excessive focus on innovation can contribute to the emergence of maladaptive tendencies in
(transport) planning. It uses evolutionary theory to structure the argument and automated vehicles as
an example.
4.1. Maladaptation and the First Evolutionary Principle: Promotion of Variety through the Creation
of Alternatives
Maladaptive planning practices can emerge when stakeholders engage in processes that either
promote variety of alternatives exclusively within a narrow area of (their) interest or, conversely,
when they block the emergence of alternatives outside that area of interest. Both situations are
problematic because adaptive capacity is favored by having multiple alternatives of very different
natures available when challenges appear. Even if many of these alternatives will prove to be inadequate,
the more alternatives there are, the greater the probability that at least some will offer suitable responses
to emerging problems. If, however, stakeholders establish excessively strong priorities for a given
technological or social area or, even worse, to a given alternative within that area—see the notions of
technology push and policy pull by Von Schomberg [34]—it becomes possible that the most suitable
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solutions for emergent problems are to be found completely outside the chosen area of investment.
This is maladaptive because collective human action leads to situations that are unfavorable to their
own capacity to adjust to the unknown. This reasoning is supported by Pfotenhauer and Juhl [1],
for whom the narrowing of policy options is one of the consequences of the pro-innovation logic.
This seems to be a paradox as, at first sight, innovation comes across as a means to expand policy
options. However, in practice, the dominant pro-innovation logic systematically downgrades and
alienates other logics that fail to comply with the imperative of continuously and rapidly replacing the
old by the new.
Application to Automated Transport
AVs require top artificial intelligence abilities, refined motoring and safety devices,
and cutting-edge navigation and communication technologies. In this sense, AVs represent not
only a future vision that requires innovation to emerge, but also powerful catalysts for innovation
and generators of alternatives for the future within a clearly high-tech area of development [76].
The advocators of AVs argue that these machines will lead to several benefits of great importance
precisely because these machines will incorporate all these innovations. Some of the benefits they ask
the public to expect are higher levels of car sharing; reduced costs of travel for people and freight;
improved quality of road travel experience; reduced congestion, accidents, and car ownership; and
economic growth [86–89].
However, there is a flipside to this optimistic perspective. Justified by these potential benefits
(which are being questioned by an increasing number of critical authors, see [4,75,76,79]), the increased
focus on AVs can lead, and probably is already leading, to decreased attention for public transport
and other mobility solutions. Indeed, several of their proponents see AVs as direct competitors and
as suitable replacements for public transport solutions that are likely to effectively decrease the use
of such solutions (and of active modes of travel as well) [89–91]. It is still uncertain how AVs will
interact with pedestrians, cyclists, and other active modes of transport [92]. In other words, focusing
on AVs is likely to be associated with a decrease in attention to, and a decrease of use of, other modes
of transport and, possibly, to the creation of urban environments where these other modes will be seen
as undesirable or even unsafe alternatives by travelers and commuters. This is a lost opportunity for
active travelling and the addressing of obesity and physical inactivity problems through transport
policy (for insights on the relevance of doing so, see [93,94]).
Additionally, AVs are most likely to be part of a covert surveillance strategy promoted by Big Tech
firms [60,61]. This strategy is aimed at using not only the internet, but also the (smart) city as a whole,
as a comprehensive and integrated space of data collection, behavior prediction and control, and very
deep commodification of human emotion, cognition, and behavior. Important questions emerge from
such a possibility: Is the smart city a space where alternatives to surveillance technologies are not to be
found? Will privacy constitute a high-end luxury for the very few [95]? AVs are thus also examples
of surveillance and control devices of the smart city paradigm: They are not only supposed to fully
monitor where people go, they will also be able to fully control where people go and what they are
allowed to experience during the trip—in particular, if Big Tech firms are allowed to implement a
corporate ownership model for AVs [96].
The emphasis on AVs we see today is thus problematic because it threatens the viability of the
first evolutionary principle: While it is promoting variety of alternatives within the narrow area of
transport automation—and is therefore ignoring important criticisms made on the excessive reliance
on technology to solve societal problems [8,9]—it is becoming a threat for variety outside it.
4.2. Maladaptation and the Second and Third Evolutionary Principles: Assessment and Selection of
Alternatives for Local Implementation
The second and third evolutionary principles (assessment and selection) will be jointly considered
here. In order to achieve high adaptive capacity, it is constructive if stakeholders assess and select
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alternatives using the most holistic and informed evaluation methodologies at hand. As alerted by
Urban and associates [48], evolutionary assessment approaches require multiple types of validity.
In other words, creating assessment tools and selecting alternatives based on their ability to perform
particularly well in just one assessment dimension, but not in several, is a potentially maladaptive
policy-making practice. Supporting this logic, the work of Bertolini [46,47,73] suggests that—in the
presence of high levels of complexity and uncertainty about the future as those we have today—it is
important that policy makers prepare societies in general, and the transport sector in particular, to be not
only resilient, but also adaptive. In the same vein, Stilgoe and Owen [52] argued that responsiveness (that
is, the capacity to change the direction and type of innovation-oriented developments when confronted
with the unexpected) is a key dimension of what he calls responsible innovation. Von Schomberg [34] asks
for the systematic use of technology assessment and technology foresight approaches. This echoes the
views of Docherty and Marsden [4], who alert their readers for the need to balance well the short-term
benefits and costs of a given mobility innovation with their long-term consequences.
Application to Automated Transport
Regarding assessment and selection of alternatives, the automotive industry is promoting an
(overly) optimistic imagination about AVs at the same time that they are doing their best efforts to
accelerate the implementation of such vehicles. As noted by Docherty and Marsden [4], contemporary
imaginings of mobility are, to a large extent, crafted by the producers of mobility innovations.
This happens because the automotive industry has high stakes in the development and positive
marketing of AVs: The car is losing its original appeal and economic profitability, as younger
generations seem to be consistently reducing its use [97,98]. The success of AVs would potentially mean
a new prosperous phase for this industry [90]. At the same time, local authorities see the economic
short-term advantages of allowing AVs in their streets because this might provide them with some
credits in terms of urban marketing and positioning in city rankings. Critical authors argue that
AVs can lead to very negative consequences for urban areas if poorly governed (e.g., [4,79]), but this
research continues to be relatively marginal while major interests portray smart transportation as a
highly beneficial innovation to be promoted and lavishly funded [86,99]. The willingness to promote
this agenda is leading the engaged stakeholders to depict it as offering high benefits so that the societal
costs associated with developing it can be seen as reasonable by the public. As Zuboff [61] describes,
Big Tech firms systematically use their substantial budgets and massive influence to force the rapid
implementation of disruptive innovations so that a new normal can rapidly be created. To work,
this needs to be done before any serious democratic or ethical scrutiny, and before the establishment of
legal frameworks capable of blocking or shaping actions so that they might serve the public interest
(see, also, [4]).
If the focus on innovation was not so strong today, there would likely be a more critical appreciation
of these situations, as well as more inclusive democratic discussions about which innovations should
be considered desirable or undesirable. As contemporary policy-making embraces a pro-innovation
bias strongly enforced by Big Tech, what we are witnessing is an increasing number of cities preparing
to welcome AVs onto their streets (see, for example, [86]) without making a serious effort to determine
the benefits and costs of such an innovation. Cities are moving towards this future also without
seriously asking whether citizens desire or at least accept it—a key social inclusion practice recognized
as needed both by transport [100,101] and critical innovation scholars [52]. In this way, pro-innovation
forces are interfering with the evolutionary principles by crushing the first principle (creation of
variety) onto the second and third principles (assessment and selection of initiatives) so that they
can rapidly move towards dissemination. In desirable circumstances, new ideas appear and are then
tested and discussed to determine the extent to which they are valid and should be implemented and
disseminated. Under the pro-innovation logic, new ideas must be rapidly disseminated without such
scrutiny or discussion [1,9,61].
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4.3. Maladaptation and the Fourth Evolutionary Principle: Dissemination in Various Contexts
Dissemination is the fourth, and final, evolutionary principle for good reasons. First, because
it should typically be applied after its object was successfully tested in a limited number of places
and proved to have benefits that exceed the costs of dissemination. Second, and in connection
with the first, because—if it proves to be problematic—the localized scope of implementation and
testing geographically limits the negative consequences. As recommended by Stilgoe and Owen [52],
innovations should be implemented in ways that allow for responsiveness to the unpredictable.
Dissemination being typically the last step is, therefore, a precautionary and sensible choice in most
cases and one likely to contribute to avoiding the risks of maladaptive initiatives proliferating too
rapidly. For further insights see, for example, the critical reflections on urban experimentation as
an increasingly dominant practice in contemporary urban policy-making provided by Savini and
Bertolini [102].
Application to Automated Transport
As AVs are still in an initial stage of development, it seems rather unlikely that there are already safe,
ethical, and economically sound conditions to disseminate these machines. However, dissemination is
already taking place for testing purposes [90]. This is problematic for several reasons. First, it takes
advantage of the legal void concerning this innovation to create a new normal while exploring different
geographical areas and gather sensitive data without giving time to local authorities and national
governments to prepare and scrutinize the process [61]. As alerted by Stilgoe and Owen [52], emerging
innovations have the tendency to fall into institutional voids (see, also, [103]). Actively capitalizing
on these voids is well-aligned with the principles of cybernetic urbanism [60], according to which
decisions should automatically flow from data analysis and technological advances without the need
for political debate. This is not only coercive and unethical, but also a threat to democracy [61] and an
obvious problem for the governance of the transport sector [4]. Even though this is not maladaptive
in itself (even though it is necessarily undemocratic), it can lead to all sorts of problematic outcomes.
Indeed, and as argued by Milakis and associates [104], AVs are likely to have short-term benefits, for
example, reduced accidents and emissions while promoting greater road capacity and fuel efficiency.
However, it is unclear whether the middle- and long-term outcomes will be positive, as expressed in
changes in economic vitality, public health, and social justice. This suggests that disseminating AVs is
an option to be considered with great care and to be carefully governed [4,79]. However, as shown in
research about planners, “the constraints of neo-liberal politics that shape the context of planning have
led some planners into an almost existential doubt over the extent to which AVs can be shaped by
planning and public policy at all” [105] p. 99. At the same time, a range of academics are assuming that
the introduction of AVs into the urban environment is a certainty that cities should prepare themselves
for (e.g., through appropriate land use and parking policies) instead of something that should be
democratically debated. This nihilistic understanding held by a growing number of public officials and
even academic researchers is a sign of alarm. It reveals the extent to which pro-innovation corporate
powers in general, and the car industry in particular, have gathered immense powers to shape our
imaginations about urban futures (as noted by [4]). Indeed, there is a growing public consensus
that technological development is a quasi-natural force that societies need to adapt to, instead of
being merely the result of unregulated actions conducted by concrete people working for specific
corporations [61].
5. Re-Thinking Innovation in Planning: Policy Recommendations
The previous sections presented a critical analysis of some mechanisms through which an excessive
focus on innovation might lead to the emergence of maladaptive policies and initiatives in planning.
This allows us to present a summarizing table (Table 1) where a number of key policy recommendations
are offered. These recommendations may inspire planners in general, and transport planners in
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particular, to think about how to govern emergent innovations. Even though we have used the example
of AVs, this table has the potential to inform many other areas of activity beyond both urban and
transport planning.
Table 1 was produced assuming a number of shifts that innovation policy applied to planning
could experience in the name of the public interest. Four shifts in particular should be highlighted.
They are phrased in a purposefully radical manner, so that they are more prone to spark reactions and
promote debate among planners about this topic.
The first shift concerns values: From a current logic where innovation and the innovative are
considered positive values and goals, we would make a shift towards a logic where innovation is
merely a means to achieve meaningful values and goals (e.g., sustainability, justice).
The second shift would complement the first and would be about focus: Presently, innovation
receives high levels of attention from a wide variety of stakeholders, and has taken a key place in
contemporary discourses. After this shift, innovation would be considered only when relevant, as well
as maintenance of the establishment (that is, to adopt the do-nothing alternative) and retrieval of previous
configurations (that is, to adopt technologies and practices that were constructively used in the past and
were, to a larger or lesser extent, abandoned—consider, for example, cycling).
This leads us to the third shift, which would be concerned with speed: At the moment, there is a
substantial support for rapid and disruptive innovations as market-driven mechanisms to promote
economic growth. After this shift, the speed of innovations and the level of disruption induced by
them should be carefully and critically considered when analyzing the specific characteristics of places,
people, organizations, technologies, and the goals to be achieved (among other possible factors to be
identified through reflection and experience).
The fourth and last shift would be about legitimacy: Innovations of all kinds (including those with
massive disruptive potential) are today being freely implemented in contemporary societies as they
are presented as free market products. After this shift, disruptive innovations would be disseminated
only after they are critically assessed by democratic means as contributing to the public interest and an
appropriate legal and governance framework was created to receive them.
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Table 1. List of policy recommendations for planners concerned with innovation policy in general and automated vehicles (AVs) in particular.
Evolutionary
Principle Policy Recommendations for Planners
Promotion of
variety through
the creation of
alternatives
• Encourage policies capable of generating alternatives that might prove to be useful in the future, even if the scenarios where these alternatives will be needed are
considered unlikely today. Conversely, avoid the promotion of alternatives strictly within a narrow area of policy interest (e.g., automated vehicles) and—above
all—avoid placing too many resources and attention on a given alternative (e.g., a given model or brand of automated vehicles).
• Promote a rich and varied market while avoiding the establishment of corporate monopolies with the power to enforce their products and services in the market
beyond the reach of other competitors.
• Avoid placing too much emphasis on AVs and other smart-mobility solutions; instead, maintain a variety of options under consideration. These should include both
high-tech (e.g., AVs) but also low tech (e.g., cycling) alternatives, as well as both collective and individual transport alternatives. The same could be said about
varieties of fuels adopted, about having global and high-mobility oriented alternatives (e.g., high-speed trains), and local and low-mobility ones (e.g., favorable
conditions for walking and using local products and services), as well as both smart and non-digital technologies.
• Seriously consider the do-nothing alternative. Consider the possibility of using the lack of change as an opportunity to evaluate and learn about the long-term
effects of previous innovations and answering questions such as: What have previous innovations brought to society? Where they useful, ethical, constructive?
Who has lost and who has won from them? How could they have been better implemented? Which alternatives were discarded and should not have been? Should
we return to previous configurations? Should we maintain the do-nothing approach? For how long? Why?
Assessment and
selection of
alternatives for
local
implementation
• Assess and select alternatives using the most holistic and comprehensive evaluation methodologies possible. The best is to promote alternatives that score high in
diverse forms of assessment characterized by diverse (and even mutually contradictory) goals and, at the same time, can be adapted or adjusted to unpredictable
developments and future scenarios.
• Use a variety of methodologies for assessment, both econometric and non-econometric. Avoid relying too much on methodologies for assessment that are
excessively bound by the technical and ideological principles of a given disciplinary area, e.g., Cost-Benefit Analysis (as it is excessively associated with econometric
assessment principles).
• Carefully analyze who gains and who loses from the implementation of the innovation under consideration as it is unlikely that a given innovation will benefit all.
• Avoid implementing alternatives that require an excessive level of commitment to and reliance on its success. Instead, give preference to alternatives that—if, where,
and when they fail—are sufficiently easy to adapt, retrofit, or—if needed—dismiss. This means that planners should not be preparing cities to the advent of AVs
(and smart forms of mobility in general) while taking that advent for granted. Instead, planners should prepare cities for the possibility that AVs may emerge and
become dominant, just as much as for a reality in which they emerge and fail; or in which they never emerge.
• Seriously consider the do-nothing alternative and, with this, keep open the possibility of non-implementation.
Dissemination in
various contexts
if, when and
where
appropriate
• Accept and support dissemination of disruptive innovations only if, when, and where there is a suitable and democratically established legal framework in the
places where the innovations are to be disseminated. Consider making use of ethical boards, audits, and public participation events as means to inform the legal
framework and the dissemination strategy.
• Disseminate slowly and incrementally in tandem with monitoring and evaluation processes so that it becomes possible to identify unexpected outcomes that were
not observed before.
• Maintain a skeptical attitude towards “for-profit” Big Tech companies (e.g., Google, Cisco, Amazon, Facebook, etc.) and their fast-paced dissemination initiatives.
Critically analyze who are the likely losers and winners from each disseminated innovation.
• Seriously consider the do-nothing alternative and, with this, keep open the possibility of non-dissemination.
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6. Conclusions
In this article, we have highlighted the drawbacks associated with the excessive focus on innovation
experienced today. We achieved this through the lenses of evolutionary theory. Our fundamental
point is that innovations, if poorly governed, can, and are even likely to, lead societal evolution along
a path that is maladaptive. That is, social and technological configurations change for the sake of
changing due to a fascination with the innovative as a meta-goal of public policy and with too little
connection with the problems in place. Under the rule of maladaptive forces, planning can follow
a problematic direction where new configurations come to be assessed as positive and deserving of
selection and dissemination for no other reason than being novel. This is one of the key traits of the
dominant innovation agenda we have today, and it is something that needs to be acknowledged as a
serious governance problem.
This problem is clearly taking place in the transport sector due to the dominance of technological
developers in its governance and in the funding of academic research. Indeed, digitalization in general
and automation in particular are very powerful trends in this sector [106] and are a serious challenge
for its governance [4]. Furthermore, transport systems and technologies are very conducive to produce
and benefit from real-time data. However, and as alerted by Zuboff [61] (among other critical authors),
it is precisely in the possibility of data extraction that lies both the power and the source of revenues
from Big Tech companies. These have clearly demonstrated that their intentions are not as ethical as
would be desirable [61,107] and are in need of a strong regulatory framework capable of guiding their
actions in general, and their new products in particular. The time is ripe for planners to more critically
evaluate innovations and their added societal value, in view of the recommendations provided above
(for a summary, see Table 1).
We have proposed here a number of concrete policy recommendations for a new generation
of innovation policies applied to planning in general, and transport planning in particular.
These recommendations entail rethinking the values, focus, speed, and legitimacy of innovations. Still,
future critical research in this area is most needed. We are experiencing a societal lock-in, where our
economic system became dependent on disruptive innovations to keep itself working. Instead of
considering this a problem, major institutions, such as the EU, place this dependency at the core of
their strategies (see, for example, [20]). Exploring ways out of this lock-in is a relevant and even urgent
research enterprise, and we hope that this article will motivate others to embrace it.
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